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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)(j). This appeal is subject to reassignment to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue # 1: Did the District Court err in ruling as a matter of law that, although a 
municipal road is unsafe in its current condition due to its lack of being maintained, 
private citizens cannot require the municipality to undertake repairs to the road to make it 
safe? 
Standard of Appellate Review: Correctness. Determination of the 
obligations of a municipality relative to repair of its roads on summary judgment 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness and according no particular deference 
to the legal conclusion reached by the district court. Day v. State ex rel Utah 
Dept of Public Safety, 1999 UT 46, j^8, 980 P.2d 1171. 
Preservation of Issue Below: This issue was directly addressed by the trial 
court in its March 30, 2007 Memorandum decision. 
Issue #2: Did the District Court err in ruling as a matter of law that although a 
municipal road is unsafe in its current condition due to its lack of being maintained, 
private citizens cannot require the municipality to accept the private citizen's funds for 
the purpose of repairing the road to make it safer than it was? 
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Standard of Appellate Review: Correctness. Determination of the 
obligations of a municipality relative to repair of its roads on summary judgment 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness and according no particular deference 
to the legal conclusion reached by the district court. Day v. State ex rel Utah 
Dept of Public Safety, 1999 UT 46, f 8, 980 P.2d 1171 
Preservation of Issue Below: This issue was directly addressed by the trial 
court in its March 30, 2007 Memorandum decision. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann., § 63-30d-301(3): 
(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity from suit of each 
governmental entity is waived as to any injury caused by: 
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, 
alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other 
structure located on them; or 
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public building, structure, 
dam, reservoir, or other public improvement. 
(b) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived if the injury 
arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other 
structure located on them; or 
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, 
structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement. 
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1. Utah Code Ann., §72-3-104; 
(1) City streets comprise: 
(a) highways, roads, and streets within the corporate limits of the 
municipalities that are not designated as class A state roads or as class B 
roads; and 
(b) those highways, roads, and streets located within a national forest and 
constructed or maintained by the municipality under agreement with the 
appropriate federal agency. 
(2) City streets are class C roads. 
(3) Except for city streets within counties of the first and second class as 
defined in Section 17-50-501, the state and city have joint undivided interest in 
the title to all rights-of-way for all city streets. 
(4) The municipal governing body exercises sole jurisdiction and control of the 
city streets within the municipality. 
(5) The department shall cooperate with the municipal legislative body in the 
construction and maintenance of the class C roads within each municipality. 
(6) The municipal legislative body shall expend or cause to be expended upon 
the class C roads the funds allocated to each municipality from the 
Transportation Fund under rules made by the department. 
* # * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Town of Fairfield (the "Town") issued a weight limitation ordinance in 
August 2005, which prevented many of the large trucks operated by the Appellants from 
using a Town road known as 1600 North (hereinafter referred to as the "Road"). 
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Plaintiffs/Appellants brought suit seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the 
weight limitation ordinance. At a preliminary injunction hearing, the trial court granted 
Plaintiffs/Appellants' request for preliminary relief and enjoined the Town from 
enforcing its weight limitation ordinance on the Road pending a trial on the merits of 
Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims. Anxious to have the Road repaired so that their trucks 
might safely use the Road, Plaintiffs/Appellants subsequently submitted a proposal to the 
Town whereby Plaintiffs/Appellants offered to pay all costs associated with conducting 
such repairs on the Road as necessary to place the Road in the same condition in which 
Utah County had maintained the Road. The Town flatly rejected Plaintiffs/Appellants' 
proposal stating that unless Plaintiffs/Appellants were willing to pay for the 
reconstruction of the Road in accordance with the Town's requirements for 
reconstruction (which requirements Plaintiffs/Appellants estimate would cost in excess of 
$300,000), the Town was unwilling to allow Plaintiffs/Appellants to pay for, or otherwise 
cause to be performed, any repairs on the Road. Furthermore, the Town failed to make 
the repairs suggested by Plaintiffs/Appellants needed to maintain the Road in a safe and 
usable condition for travel. 
Thereafter Plaintiffs/Appellants were allowed to amend their Complaint to include 
the following cause of action whereby Plaintiffs/Appellants sought an order from the trial 
court requiring the Town to perform its statutory and common law duty to maintain the 
Road in a safe condition for travel: 
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Based on [the Town's] refusal to conduct any repairs on the Road in breach 
of its duty to maintain the Road in a reasonably safe condition for travel, 
[Plaintiffs/Appellants] are entitled to an order from the Court requiring [the 
Town] to repair the Road. Alternatively, [Plaintiffs/Appellants] are entitled 
to an order from the Court permitting [Plaintiffs/Appellants] to hire and pay 
for an independent contractor to make any necessary repairs to the Road. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
After a preliminary injunction hearing held on October 26, 2005 and November 8, 
2005, the Court issued an injunction, pending trial, preventing the Town from enforcing 
its weight ordinance. Later in its March 30, 2007 Memorandum Decision, which ruled 
on the Town's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court determined that it did 
not have the authority to require the Town to either repair the Fairfield Road or to accept 
money from the Plaintiffs for the purpose of repairing the same. However, the trial court 
reserved for trial the issue of the validity and enforceability of the Town weight 
ordinance. During the course of the trial, which commenced on April 16, 2007, the trial 
court held by reason of testimony from Town witnesses, that the Fairfield Road in its 
present condition is unsafe for the traveling public due to the potholes and other 
deterioration of the Road. However, the trial court did not reverse its earlier Decision 
with regard to requiring the Town to make needed repairs. After the end of the full trial, 
the injunction with regard to the weight ordinance was made permanent, and a final 
Order was entered on September 24, 2007 to that effect. Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal 
from the Decision granting the partial summary judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Town of Fairfield ("Town") is an incorporated municipality of the 
State of Utah located in the South-central section of Cedar Valley in western Utah 
County. The Town was incorporated in late 2004. The Town is located in one of the 
most rural, agrarian areas of Utah County. R. at 523. 
2. The primary residential area of the Town is located very near State Road 
73. R. at 523. 
3. Plaintiffs/Appellants all are businesses or individuals engaged in farming 
operations immediately East of the Town. R. at 523. 
4. The case arises out of Plaintiffs/Appellants' use of a road located within the 
Town known as 1600 North Street ("Road"). R. at 522. 
5. The western terminus of the Road is at its intersection with State Road 73, 
which is a highway traversing Cedar Valley from the Lehi area of Utah county, past 
Cedar Fort, Fairfield and on toward Faust. R. at 522. 
6. At its western terminus, and for the first mile or so of its length, the Road is 
known as 1540 North. R. at 522. 
7. For many years before the incorporation of the Town, Utah County 
maintained the Road, including that portion of the Road that is located away from the 
primary residential area of the Town. R. at 522. 
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8. Following the Town's incorporation the County no longer provided 
maintenance for the Road. Nor has the Town provided any maintenance on the Road. R. 
at 521. 
9. In 2006, TNT Construction, owned by a Town resident, filled the potholes 
on that portion of the Road located in the primary residential area of the Town. It did not, 
however, make any repairs to the rest of the Road. R. at 520. 
10. The portion of the Road repaired by TNT Construction, a section of Road 
over which the trucks must ravel to access Highway 73, has held up remarkably well with 
the modest maintenance that TNT performed. R. at 520. 
11. Since the preliminary injunction hearing in October and November 2005, 
the Town has not spent any money nor invested any time or labor in maintaining the 
Road after it leaves the primary residential area of the Town. Because the Road has not 
been maintained, it has deteriorated considerably since the preliminary injunction 
hearing. R. at 518. 
12. As the Road has continued to deteriorate following the preliminary 
injunction hearing, plaintiffs obtained a bid from TNT Construction for repairs to the S-
turn on the Road and other repairs. Plaintiffs also agreed to pay all of the cost for these 
repairs. However, the Town refused this offer by plaintiffs. At the same time, the Town 
has not spent any funds to make any repairs to the Road. R. at 518. 
13. On May 24, 2005 Earthtec Testing & Engineering, P.O., the engineering 
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firm advising the Town ("Earthtec") sent a letter to the Town in which it recommended 
that the Road be completely rebuilt, with a pavement section of 4 inches of asphalt, over 
6 inches of road base, over 8 inches of sub base. Exhibit 4 to Preliminary Injunction 
hearing. 
14. In July 2005, Earthtec sent a subsequent letter in which it recommended an 
alternative proposed pavement improvement for the Road. This alternative was prepared 
by Earthtec after the Plaintiffs/Appellants advised the Town that they were willing to 
participate to some extent in the cost of the improvement of the Road. R. at 514. 
15. In July 2005, Earthtec sent a letter to the Town in which it recommended an 
alternative proposed pavement improvement for the Road. This alternative was prepared 
by Earthtec after the Plaintiffs/Plaintiffs/Appellants advised the Town that they were 
willing to participate to some extent in the cost of the improvement of the Road. R. at 
514. 
16. The Town did not make any of the improvements recommended in the July 
2005 letter. R. at 514. 
17. The Town's own witnesses, including the Town Mayor, have said that the 
Road is in terrible condition and is not safe. Preliminary Injunction Hearing Tr. at 82, 
116. 
18. The Town was ultimately enjoined from enforcing its weight limit 
ordinance. R. at 526. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under both Utah statutory law and common law a Utah municipality clearly owes 
a duty to maintain the roads under its control and jurisdiction in a safe and reasonable 
condition. Because this duty to maintain is a clear, mandatory and non-delegable duty 
under Utah law, a court may order a municipality to fulfill such duty in the event the 
municipality has either failed or refused to do so. The imposition of such an order is 
nonetheless subject to certain limitations relating to the municipality's discretionary 
rights. In other words, while a court may order the performance of the duty to maintain, a 
court may not order (and a municipality retains the discretion over) the particular way in 
which the municipality performs the repairs required to bring an unsafe road to a safe and 
usable condition. Because the Town has refused to fulfill its duty to safely maintain and 
otherwise to make necessary repairs to the Road, despite the fact that the Town has 
repeatedly admitted that the Road's condition is terrible and unsafe and despite the fact 
that the Town has rejected any payments by Plaintiffs/Appellants for some or all of the 
necessary repairs, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court and order that 
the Town perform its duty to maintain the Road in a safe and usable condition. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT LACKED THE 
AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE TOWN TO PERFORM ITS DUTY TO 
MAINTAIN THE ROAD IN A SAFE AND USABLE CONDITION. 
A. The Utah Legislature Has Imposed Upon Each Utah Municipality an 
Affirmative Duty to Keep the Roads under the Municipality's Control and 
Jurisdiction in a Safe and Usable Condition. 
Statutes relating to, among other things, the designation of the State of Utah's 
roads, streets and highways, the division of jurisdiction and control over those roads, 
streets and highways and the duties arising out of such jurisdiction and control are all 
contained in Utah's Transportation Code (the "Code"), located at Section 72 of the Utah 
Code Annotated. Section 72-3-104 of the Code states that the "municipal governing 
body exercises sole jurisdiction and control of the city streets within the municipality" 
and thus is responsible for the "construction and maintenance" of such city streets (which 
are designated as "Class C" roads under the Code). See U.C.A., §§ 72-3-104(4), (5), and 
(7)(a). Section 72-6-108 of the Code sets forth certain conditions with which a 
municipality must comply in connection with the performance of its construction and 
maintenance duties. In part, that section requires a municipality to cause plans, 
specifications, and estimates to be made prior to the construction of any qualifying 
"improvement project." 
Section 72-6-109 of the Code, in turn, contains definitions of various terms that 
both appear in and are referenced by Section 72-6-108. Subsection (l)(d) of Section 72-
10 
6-109 defines the term "improvement project" as "construction and maintenance as 
defined in this section except for that maintenance excluded under Subsection (2)." 
Subsection (l)(e) of Section 72-6-109 then defines the term "maintenance" as follows: 
(e) "Maintenance" means the keeping of a road facility in a safe and 
usable condition to which it was constructed or improved, and includes: 
(i) the reworking of an existing surface by the application of up to 
and including two inches of bituminous pavement; 
(ii) the installation or replacement of guardrails, seal coats, and 
culverts; 
(iii) the grading or widening of an existing unpaved road or 
flattening of shoulders or side slopes to meet current width and 
safety standards; and 
(iv) horizontal or vertical alignment changes necessary to bring an 
existing road in compliance with current safety standards. 
U.C.A., § 72-6-109(l)(e) (emphasis added). Subsection (2) of Section 72-6-109 excludes 
from the definition of "improvement project" qualifications contained in Section 72-6-
108 of the Act, the following types of maintenance work: "(a) the repair of less than the 
entire surface by crack sealing or patching; and (b) road repairs incidental to the 
installation, replacement, or repair of water mains, sewers, drainage pipes, culverts, or 
curbs and gutters.55 U.C.A., § 72-6-109(2). 
Accordingly, as outlined above, the Utah Legislature has imposed on each 
municipality within the State of Utah, a statutory duty of constructing and maintaining 
the streets within the boundaries of the municipality (i.e. all streets under the control and 
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jurisdiction of the municipality). In further delineating the obligations associated with 
this statutory duty, the Utah Legislature also defines the type of "maintenance" required 
to be performed by a municipality in order to fulfill the duty of maintaining its city 
streets, to wit, "the keeping of a road facility in a safe and usable condition to which it 
was constructed or improved." See U.C.A., § 72-109(l)(e) (emphasis added). 
The duty to maintain is not discretionary inasmuch as nowhere in the Code is a 
municipality given any option not to maintain its roads. Therefore, in order for the Town 
to fulfill its affirmative and nondiscretionary duty under the Code to maintain its city 
streets, the Utah Legislature requires that the Town keep its streets "in a safe and usable 
condition." 
B. Utah Courts Have Consistently Held that Municipalities in the State of 
Utah are under a Legal Duty to Keep Their Streets in a Reasonably Safe 
Condition for Travel. 
The statutory duty outlined above and imposed by the Utah Legislature upon each 
municipality to maintain all roads under the municipality's control and jurisdiction in a 
safe and usable condition, is consistent with (and virtually identical to) a common law 
duty that Utah courts have uniformly imposed on all Utah municipalities during the past 
century. In Lee v. West Valley City, 860 P.2d 336 (Utah 1993), for example, this Court 
stated the following regarding such a legal duty: "it has long been the law in Utah (going 
back to its territorial era) that a municipality has a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep 
streets which it has opened for travel and which it has invited the public to use in a 
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reasonably safe condition for travel." Id. at 338; see also Bowen v. Riverton, 656 P.2d 
434, 437 (Utah 1982) (a Utah municipality has "a nondelegable duty to exercise due care 
in maintaining streets within its corporate boundaries in a reasonably safe condition for 
travel."), citing Murray v. Ogden City, 548 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976); see also Morris v. Salt 
Lake City, 101 P. 373, 377 (Utah 1909) (holding that it is "the primary duty of the city to 
exercise reasonable care to maintain the streets in a reasonably safe condition and to 
guard against injury to persons and property by removing or making reasonably safe any 
dangerous objects in the streets.") In Trapp v. Salt Lake City Corp., 835 P.2d 161 (Utah 
1992), this Court noted that the duty of municipalities to maintain their streets in a safe 
and usable condition is "generally grounded upon the common law principle that one 
who has control over a physical facility has an obligation to keep it in a safe condition." 
Id. at 162. 
C. Consistent with the Imposition of a Duty to Maintain Roads in Safe and 
Usable Condition, the Utah Legislature has waived Governmental 
Immunity for Injuries Caused by a Defective Road. 
Consistent with the statutory and legal duties imposed upon a Utah municipality to 
maintain its roads in a safe and usable condition, Utah's Governmental Immunity Act 
(U.C.A., § 63-30d-301 et seq.) specifically states, in relevant part, as follows: 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity from suit of each 
governmental entity is waived as to any injury caused by: 
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
other structure located on t hem; . . . 
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Utah Code Ann., § 63-30d-301(3)(a)(i) (emphasis added). Indeed, in Villiers v. Utah 
County, 882 P.2d 1161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the Utah Court of Appeals specifically held 
that a municipality's "duty to keep its streets maintained in a reasonably safe condition 
for public use" is "consistent with" the Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 1165 
(referencing the previous version of the above-quoted section), citing Trapp, 835 P.2d at 
161-62. 
Based on the foregoing review of Utah statutory law and case law, it is clear that 
the Town has an affirmative and nondelegable statutory duty and legal duty to maintain 
the streets within its boundaries, including the Road, in a reasonably safe and usable 
condition. The only remaining question is whether a court possesses the authority under 
Utah law to compel a municipality to perform its duty to maintain its roads in a safe and 
usable condition in the event that the municipality has failed or refused to do so. As 
demonstrated below, Utah law clearly provides that courts do, in fact, possess such 
authority. 
D. Under Utah Law, the Trial Court Possessed the Authority to Compel the 
Town to Fulfill Its Duty to Maintain the Road by Requiring the Town to 
Conduct All Repairs on the Road Necessary to Make the Road Safe and 
Usable. 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court, in its discretion, to 
grant the extraordinary relief of a writ in the nature of mandamus, compelling a 
municipality, among others, to fulfill or perform "an act required by law as a duty of 
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office" which the municipality has failed to or refuses to fulfill or perform. See U.R.C.P. 
65B(d)(2)(B); see also State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). While 
Rule 65B abolished traditional writs, including writs of mandamus, Utah courts "continue 
to be guided by established mandamus principles." Rice v. Utah Security Division, 95 
P.3d 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), citing Renn v. Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 682 
(Utah 1995) and Stirba, 972 P.2d at 921. 
In Renn, this Court stated the following with regards to a writ of mandamus: "The 
common law writ of mandamus was designed to compel a person to perform a legal duty 
incumbent on him by virtue of his office or as required by law." Renn, 904 P.2d at 682. 
The mere fact that the performance of a particular duty involves the exercise of judgment 
or discretion does not make relief of a writ in the nature of mandamus inapplicable to that 
duty; rather, as this Court stated in Renn, a court may "compel action, when refused, in 
matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or 
discretion in a particular way." Renn, 904 P.2d at 682 (citations omitted). Relief under 
Rule 65B is likewise limited. Accordingly, under Utah law, a party may request a court 
to "direct the exercise of discretionary action," but may not ask the court to "direct the 
exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way." Stirba, 972 P.2d at 921 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
The request for relief made by Appellants to the trial court in their Amended 
Complaint was appropriate under Utah law and should have been granted. Appellants 
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sought to have the trial court compel the Town to fulfill the Town's duty to maintain the 
Road in a safe and usable condition. Appellants at no time sought to have the trial court 
compel the Town to make any particular repairs to the Road or repair the Road in a 
"particular way," such as to demand that it repair the Road in accordance with any 
particular standard. Because Appellants' request for relief was appropriate, the trial court 
possessed the authority to require the Town to fulfill its duty to maintain the Road by 
ordering the Town to complete all repairs to the Road necessary to make the Road safe 
and usable for vehicular travel. Indeed, Appellants offered to pay the cost of repair work, 
which the Town rejected. Ordering the Town to conduct whatever repairs are required to 
make the Road safe and usable is not equivalent to directing the Town to make repairs to 
the Road in a particular way. Under such an order, the Town would be free to exercise its 
discretion in determining both what repairs to the Road should be made and the manner 
in which such repairs should be conducted, so long as the repairs selected by the Town 
and the manner in which such repairs are conducted are, when completed, sufficient to 
place the Road in a safe and usable condition in fulfillment of the Town's duty to 
maintain. 
The use of mandamus principles in the present situation is consistent with its use 
by Utah courts in similar circumstances. For example, in Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. 
Logan City, 92 P.2d 346 (Utah 1939), this Court held that mandamus was the proper 
remedy to compel a municipality to supply a service that the municipality is under a legal 
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duty to supply in situations where such service is wrongfully withheld by the 
municipality. Specifically, the Court held that a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy 
to compel a public service corporation to supply an applicant with electricity, gas, or 
water, applying reasonable rules and procedures in connection therewith. Id. at 349; 
confirmed as to the right to use mandamus in Piatt v. Town ofTorrey, 949 P.2d 325, 328 
(Utah 1997). Whereas, the service which was found to be wrongfully withheld in the 
Home Owner's case was water, the service wrongfully withheld in the present action is 
the Town's maintenance of the Road. Just as this Court held in Home Owner's that 
through mandamus, the trial court could order Logan City to perform the service of 
supplying the water that it was under a duty to supply, the trial court in the present action 
possessed the authority to compel the Town to perform the service of maintaining the 
Road in a safe and usable condition pursuant to the Town's duty to do so. Also, in the 
case of Skeen v. Ogden Rapid Transit Co., 112 P. 120 (Utah 1910) (cited with approval on 
other grounds in Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, 154 P.3d 808, this Court made clear that a 
court has the authority to enforce through mandamus duties imposed by common law 
alone. Id. at 124. 
While no Utah court has thus far faced or addressed the particular issue of whether 
a court may, through mandamus, compel a municipality to perform its statutory duty or 
even common law duty to maintain its roads in a safe and usable condition, courts from 
numerous other jurisdictions have addressed the issue and held that a court may compel 
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such action under mandamus. For example, in Willoughby v. Whetstone Township Bd., 
581 N.W.2d 165 (S.D. 1998), the plaintiffs, a group of cabin owners, brought an action 
against the defendant, the town in which the plaintiffs' cabins were located, seeking a 
writ of mandamus which would require the town to make repairs to the road used by the 
plaintiffs to access their cabins. Prior to filing the action, the plaintiffs had submitted 
several requests to the town asking that it repair the road which would deteriorate and 
become nearly impassable after heavy rains. In the years preceding the plaintiffs' 
initiation of their action, the town spent over $7,000 in connection with several annual 
attempts to repair the road. When the town efforts to repair the road failed and its plans 
for additional repairs were delayed, the plaintiffs filed suit. The trial court awarded the 
plaintiffs' request and issued a writ of mandamus against the town ordering it to make 
certain repairs to the road. On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that 
"the duty to maintain township roads is ministerial and the proper subject for mandamus 
when a township fails or refuses to act according to statute." Id. at 168. The court 
further held that the trial court had acted properly in issuing the mandamus "after it found 
the road was out of repair and the supervisors were not meeting their statutory duties" 
and that ordering, among other things, "repairs to make the road usable under expected 
conditions" was within the scope of mandamus. Id. at 169-70. 
Similarly, in Lank v. Hughes, 167 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1961), the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that a Pennsylvania statute which provides that a town shall "(a) Have the 
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general care and superintendence of the improvement of the roads... in the township... (b) 
Cause such roads to be kept in repair and reasonably free from all obstructions, and give 
the necessary directions therefore" placed a mandatory statutory duty on all towns to 
keep their roadways "in repair and reasonably free from all obstructions" and that such 
"duty to repair and maintain public roads may be enforced by mandamus." Id. at 286-87, 
citing Commonwealth v. Ball 121 Atl. 191 (1923); see also Ross v. Fox, 2003 Ohio 3513, 
P7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that provisions of an Ohio statute which provides that 
boards of township trustees shall have control of the township roads in their townships 
and shall keep them in good repair were "mandatory and can be enforced through a writ 
of mandamus."); Fund v. Village of Walton Hills, 2002 Ohio 981, P2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2002) (same); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Sutton, 119 P. 423, 428 (Okla. 1911) ("It has 
been repeatedly held that the general duty of municipal corporations 'to keep their 
highways in repair5 is ministerial, and that a writ of mandamus lies to compel its 
performance, because it is a ministerial, in contradistinction from a discretionary duty."). 
Consistent with the above-cited cases, the Utah statutes which set forth a 
municipality's duty to maintain its streets contain no discretionary language. In other 
words, nothing contained in the Code provides that a municipality "may" exercise 
jurisdiction and control over the streets within its boundaries or "may" be responsible for 
the construction or maintenance of those streets. The obligation that the Utah Legislature 
imposed on towns within the State of Utah to maintain their streets in a safe and usable 
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condition is a mandatory obligation and thus may be enforced by mandamus. In Rollow 
v. Ogden City, 243 P. 791 (Utah 1926), this Court explained that "[njothing is more 
clearly or better settled" that a town "exercises a discretionary power" in "locating and 
opening streets and in regulating travel thereon." Id. at 794. Nevertheless, the Court then 
further stated that it is "equally well settled" that once a street is located and opened by a 
town within its limits, "a positive legal duty is imposed to maintain them in a reasonably 
safe condition for travel." Accordingly, while certain Utah statutes provide discretional 
authority to a municipality in connection with certain decisions of the municipality with 
regards to the streets within its limits, such statutes do not alter the mandatory nature of 
the "well settled" duty imposed upon municipalities to maintain their streets in a safe and 
usable condition. 
Even if the statutory duty to maintain was discretionary, the well-established 
common law duty to maintain expressed by Utah courts is clearly not and may, alone, be 
compelled through mandamus. For example, in the recent case of Jamison v. City of 
Zion, 834 N.E.2d 499 (111. Ct. App. 2005), the court held that though mandamus was not 
available to enforce a discretionary statutory duty to maintain (because of the Illinois 
statute's explicit use of the term "may") a mandamus-type action was proper to compel a 
city to fulfill its common-law duty to remove obstruction from a city roadway. Id. at 503. 
It is also important to note, in situations where the Utah Legislature wishes to 
foreclose the use of mandamus-type relief to compel the performance of a particular duty, 
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it has carefully drafted statutory provisions in a way that prevents such use. For example, 
in drafting Utah's Rights-of-way Act, codified at section 72-5-101 et seq. of the Utah 
Code Annotated (the "Act"), the Utah Legislature used language that clearly provides 
that performance of the duties discussed throughout the Act cannot be compelled through 
mandamus. 
The Act deals with, in part, federal rights-of-way under the provisions of an 1866 
mining law known as RS (Revised Statute) 2477 ("R.S. 2477 rights-of-way"). Repealed 
by Congress in 1976, this mining statute was originally intended to serve the goal of 
granting the right to construct and use highways across public lands that were not 
otherwise reserved or set aside for other public uses. Section 72-5-302 of the Act states 
that the State of Utah and its political subdivisions have title to and jurisdiction over all 
R.S. 2477 rights-of-way within the state. However, section 72-5-303 of Act provides, in 
relevant part, that the state and its political subdivisions are not generally required to 
maintain highways within R.S. 2477 rights-of-way for vehicular travel unless a particular 
R.S. 2477 right-of-way encompasses a designated highway included on a state highway 
system. See U.C.A., § 72-5-303(1). Importantly, section 72-5-303 then provides that 
"[a] decision to improve or not improve an R.S. 2477 right-of-way is a purely 
discretionary function." See U.C.A., § 72-5-303(1) (emphasis added) 
In addition, section 72-5-305 of the Act states, among other things, that (i) an R.S. 
2477 right-of-way not otherwise designated as a Class A, B, or C road "is traveled at the 
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risk of the user" (U.C.A., § 72-5-305(1)); (ii) the state and its political subdivisions "do 
not waive immunity for injuries or damages" occurring in or associated with any R.S. 
2477 right-of-way (U.C.A., § 72-5-305(2)); (iii) the state and its political subdivisions 
"assume no liability for injury or damage resulting from a failure to maintain" any R.S. 
2477 right-of-way for vehicular travel (U.C.A., § 72-5-305(3)(a)); and (iv) as there are 
limited funds available to upgrade all R.S. 2477 rights-of-way to applicable safety 
standards, a decision to allocate funds for maintaining a particular R.S. 2477 right-of-
way is "the result of evaluation and assigning of priorities" and the state or a political 
subdivision of the state "must use its judgment and expertise" to evaluate which safety 
feature improvements should be made first (U.C.A., § 72-5-305(5)). 
Thus, whereas the Utah Legislature has imposed on municipalities within this 
State an affirmative duty to maintain the roads within their boundaries over which they 
have jurisdiction, the Utah Legislature has determined that the maintenance of R.S. 2477 
rights-of-way by the State is "purely a discretionary function." As such, a court cannot 
compel the State through mandamus to maintain any R.S. 2477 right-of-way. In 
addition, the Act also clearly provides that the State does not waive immunity from or 
assume any liability for injuries or damage resulting from any failure by the state to 
maintain any R.S. 2477 right-of-way. The Utah Legislature's goals and intent are clearly 
expressed in the language of the Act. 
In short, had the Utah Legislature desired that a municipality's decision to 
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maintain or not maintain its roads in a safe and usable condition be a discretional 
function, it could have used language such as that of section 72-5-303(1) of the Act to 
describe a municipality's duty to maintain. The Utah Legislature, however, drafted the 
duty to maintain as to make clear that a municipality's performance of such duty is 
mandatory and not discretionary. Because the duty is mandated under Utah law, a court 
possesses the authority to compel a municipality's performance of the duty. Accordingly, 
the trial court in this case possessed the authority to order the Town to fulfill its duty to 
maintain the Road in a safe and usable condition. The trial court's finding in its Decision 
that it lacked the authority to compel such action from the Town was, therefore, in error 
and should be reversed. 
II. THE TOWN IMPROPERLY REJECTED MONIES FROM 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS TO DO ROAD REPAIR WORK. 
Improbable as it may seem, the Town refused to accept monies from the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants which, at a minimum, would have covered all costs needed to repair 
the Road's numerous potholes to correct a curve in the Road called the "S Curve" by the 
parties. In refusing Plaintiffs/Appellants' offers, the Town, in effect, said it would not 
repair the Road but rather it would only do work on the Road if there were enough money 
(presumably paid by the Plaintiffs/Appellants) to completely reconstruct the Road with 
new base and an asphalt surface. In other words, the Town rejected any money offer 
from the Plaintiffs/Appellants, which called for the Road to be repaired and/or 
maintained despite the fact that such repairs and maintenance would have returned the 
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Road to a safe and usable condition. As a direct consequence of the Town's repeated 
rejection of the Plaintiffs/Appellants' offers, the Road has continued to deteriorate far 
beyond the few, minor potholes that existed at the time the Town passed its weight 
limitation ordinance and commenced its obstinate policy of zero maintenance on the 
Road. As the trial court specifically found, even modest repairs and maintenance efforts 
of the type for which Plaintiffs/Appellants offered to pay would have been sufficient to 
maintain the Road in a safe and usable condition, or at a minimum, better than it 
otherwise is. 
In connection with the Town's duty to keep the Road safe and usable, it was 
improper for the Town to reject the money offer from the Plaintiffs/Appellants to do 
repair and maintenance work on the Road. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court 
to strike Plaintiffs/Appellants' claim in that regard. That decision should also be reversed 
by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence at trial demonstrated beyond dispute that the Road is in disrepair, 
unfit for travel, and unsafe due to the specific refusal of the Town to make the necessary 
repairs to the Road in breach of the Town's duty. The Town has not only refused to use 
its own money to make repairs or the funds it has received from the State of Utah for 
such purpose, it has refused to accept any money from the Appellants for that purpose. 
The trial court ordered in its Ruling following the trial of this matter that Appellants 
24 
possess the right to use the Road. The Town readily admits that the Road in its present 
condition is dangerous. By refusing to repair the Road or allow anybody else to make 
repairs to the Road, the Town is in clear breach of its duty under Utah statutes and 
common law to maintain the Road in a safe and usable condition. The effect of such 
breach is not only the dangers and difficulties to which Appellants are routinely exposed, 
the Town's breach also has the effect of precluding Appellants from exercising their right 
to use the Road, as its condition is nearing a point of disrepair that all travel on it may be 
impossible. 
Because the Town clearly owes a duty to maintain the Road under Utah law and 
because the evidence clearly demonstrates that given the Road's present condition, the 
Town is not fulfilling its duty, the trial court in this matter possessed the authority to 
order the relief sought, namely that the Town makes repairs to the Road in order to make 
the Road safe and usable. The decision of the trial court in connection with the Town's 
Motion for Summary Judgment that the court lacked the authority to order the 
performance of any repairs on the Road by the Town should, therefore, be reversed. As a 
further consequence, this Court should order the Town to immediately make all repairs to 
the Road required to make the Road safe and usable. 
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DATED this / 5 day of January 2008. 
KESLER & RUST 
St 
meysfor Plaintiffs/Appellants Hogs R Us, 
Scott C. McLachlan, Zane Dansie & Keith Jonsson 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
Mark Richard 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants Utah Valley Turf 
Farms, L.C. andAultFarms, LLC 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOGS R US, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TOWN OF FAIRFIELD, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 050402661 
DATED: MARCH 29, 2007 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFBELD, JUDGE 
This matter comes before the court on defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. 
Having reviewed the file and heard oral arguments, and being fully advised, in part I grant and in 
part I deny defendant's motion. 
Factual Basis 
This case primarily involves 1600 North Street (the "Road") within the Town of Fairfield 
(the "Town"). In 2005, the Town employed Earthtec Testing and Engineering for the inspection 
of the Road, and to make recommendations for dealing with the impact of heavy truck traffic on 
the Road. Earthtec recommended that weight limitations be imposed until the Road could be 
repaved and reconstructed in the manner recommended in the prepared reports. 
On August 25, 2005, based on Earthtec's reports, the Town Council adopted Ordinance 
No. 8, which set forth weight restrictions on the Road. Plaintiffs and their commercial vendors 
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have consistently used the Road, and the Road continues to deteriorate. After several 
unsuccessful attempts between the Town and Plaintiffs to determine an agreeable level of 
improvement and payment of costs for improvement of the Road, plaintiffs filed a complaint on 
August 31, 2005 together with a motion for preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the 
Town's ordinance. This court granted the preliminary injunction on November 8, 2005. 
Ruling 
Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). All reasonable inferences drawn from the facts are viewed 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here the plaintiffs. McNair v. Farris, 944 
P.2d 392, 393 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Applying that standard here, I grant summary judgment in 
favor of the Town concluding that I do not have authority to compel the Town to make repairs or 
to allow the plaintiffs to make repairs to the Road. However, I deny summary judgment on the 
issue of the validity of the Town's weight limitation ordinance. 
1. Requiring the Town to Make Repairs or Allow the Plaintiffs to Make Repairs to the 
Road. 
The plaintiffs' amended complaint requests that this court order the Town to repair the 
Road or, in the alternative, order the Town to allow the plaintiffs to make repairs to the Road. 
Such an order clearly would exceed the limits of this court's judicial power. Utah Code Ann. § 
10-8-8 grants authority to municipal legislative councils to make decisions on whether to open, 
alter, grade, pave, or otherwise improve streets. By this statute the Town has been given the 
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statutory responsibility to make decisions regarding road improvements and repairs. It is not 
within my authority to supervise or interfere with such decisions. 
Plaintiffs argue, citing Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp., that a municipality has a 
"duty to exercise ordinary care to keep streets which it has opened for travel and which it has 
invited the public to use in a reasonable safe condition for travel." 860 P.2d 336, 338 (Utah 
1993). This statement of the law is accurate, but does not compel the relief which the plaintiff 
seek. True, a municipality may be held liable for injuries or damages resulting from dangerous 
or unsafe roads that it does not properly care for. While a municipality may have liability for 
damages, that case does not stand for the proposition that a court can order a municipality to 
spend town funds to make any specific road improvements. That decision is a legislative 
decision. As the Town observes, "a duty of care for liability purposes does not give the courts 
the prerogative to direct what repairs a municipality must undertake to make a road safe." 
Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment at 10. 
Because the Town has been given statutory authority to make such decisions, I grant 
partial summary judgment in favor of the Town, concluding that I cannot require it to make 
repairs to the Road nor require it to allow plaintiffs to make such repairs. 
2. Validity of the Town's Weight Limitation Ordinance. 
The Town seeks summary judgment determining that the Town's weight limitation 
ordinance is valid. In my view there are disputes of fact between the parties as to the meaning 
and weight to be given a letter from Earthtec. Those factual disputes preclude a grant of 
summary judgment as to the validity of the weight limitation ordinance. 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-408 provides that a municipality may impose weight restrictions 
on a road "if an engineering inspection concludes that, due to deterioration caused by climatic 
conditions, a highway will be seriously damaged or destroyed unless certain vehicles are 
prohibited or vehicle weights are restricted." This is an exception to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-401 
which limits the ability of local governments to alter weight limitations set by the State. 
The specific question as to this issue is whether a letter from Earthtec dated August 25, 
2005 provides a sufficient evidentiary basis for the Town to adopt the ordinance as an exception 
provided by Section 72-7-408. Of all the reports received by the Town from Earthtec, this letter 
contains the only reference to climatic conditions as a factor in the deterioration of the Road. A 
careful reading of the letter, however, does not establish that the deterioration has been actually 
caused by climatic conditions. Rather, it well can be argued that the letter identifies the weight 
of heavy vehicle loads is the cause of the deterioration since there is inadequate structural 
strength in the Road. In my view this is a factual issue which must be determined at trial. Thus, 
summary judgment is not appropriate and I deny partial summary judgment on this issue. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Town's counsel is directed to 
prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this T^day of March, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this ^jjQday of March, 2007: 
Joseph C. Rust 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Kesler & Rust 
Mclntyre Building, 2nd Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mark H. Richards 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Bennet, Tueller, Johnson & Deere 
3865 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Richard G. Allen 
Attorney for Defendant 
2975 West Executive Parkway #509 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
LORI WOFFINDEN 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
)eputy Clerk 
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JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
KESLER & RUST 
Mclntyre Building, 2nd Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-8000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Hogs R Us, Scott C. McLachlan, 
Zone Dansie & Keith Jonsson 
MARK H. RICHARDS (9018) 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
3865 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: (801)272-5600 
Attorneys for Utah Valley Turf Farms, L.C. 
andAult Farms, LLC _ ^ ^ _ _ _ _ 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOGS R US, a Utah corporation, SCOTT C. 
MCLACHLAN, an individual, UTAH 
VALLEY TURF FARMS, L.C, a Utah 
limited liability company, AULT FARMS, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, ZANE 
DANSIE, an individual, and KEITH 
JONSSON, an individual 
Plaintiffs 
V. 
TOWN OF FAIRFIELD, 
Defendant. 
F I N D I N G S OF F A C T A N D 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 050402661 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter having coming on for trial before the Honorable Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
commencing on April 16, 2007, with Plaintiffs Hogs R Us, Scott C. McLachlan, Zane Dansie & 
Keith Jonsson being represented by their counsel Joseph C. Rust of Kesler & Rust; and Utah Valley 
Turf Farms, L.C. and Ault Farms, LLC being represented by their counsel Mark H. Richards of 
Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere; and Defendant being represented by Richard G. Allen, and the 
Court having reviewed the file and the trial briefs submitted by counsel, and having heard the 
evidence presented, and having reviewed the exhibits presented, hereby FINDS and CONCLUDES 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Town of Fairfield is an incorporated municipality of the State of Utah located in the 
South-central section of Cedar Valley in western Utah County. The Town was incorporated 
in late 2004. The Town is located in one of the most rural, agrarian areas of Utah County. 
The Governor's Office of Planning and Budget, Demographic and Economic Analysis 
Department lists Fairfield's population at 133 residents. 
2. The primary residential area of the Town is located very near State Road 73. 
3. Plaintiffs all are businesses or individuals engaged in farming operations immediately East 
of the Town. 
4. With the exception of Scott McLachlan, none of the plaintiffs own property nor operate their 
farming, ranching or other businesses within the Town limits. 
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5. Rather, all of such plaintiffs own and farm property near the eastern boundary of the Town, 
but located either within the unincorporated area of Utah County or within the limits of the 
City of Eagle Mountain. 
6. The case arises out of plaintiffs' use of a road located within the Town known as 1600 North 
Street (the "Road"). 
7. The western terminus of the Road is at its intersection with State Road 73, which is a 
highway traversing Cedar Valley from the Lehi area of Utah county, past Cedar Fort, 
Fairfield and on toward Faust. 
8. At its western terminus, and for the first mile or so of its length, the Road is known as 1540 
North. 
9. After running nearly due East from State Road 73 for approximately four town blocks, the 
Road leaves the primary residential area of the Town, continues East for more than one-half 
mile, makes a large "S" turn and then continues East for approximately one and one-half 
miles more. From the S-turn eastward the Road is known as 1600 North. 
10. The eastern terminus of the Road is its intersection with 16000 West. 
11. For many years before the incorporation of the Town, Utah County maintained the Road, 
including that portion of the Road that is located away from the primary residential area of 
the Town. 
12. The County's maintenance of the Road consisted of grading the road twice per year to repair 
potholes and washboarding. 
U U U J - , * -
13. In approximately 2000, while the County was responsible for maintenance of the road, the 
Environmental Protection Agency conducted a study and concluded that many of the 
roadways in the Town had arsenic and other heavy metals in them because the roadways had 
been constructed, at least in part, with tailings from the Manning Canyon mines. Thus, the 
EPA recommended that, in order to avoid toxic dust from billowing up during road 
maintenance, the County should grade the Road only after soaking it with water or after a 
rainstorm. In order to avoid these problems, the County instead chose to install a chip seal 
on all the roads within the Town, including on the Road. 
14. The process of installing a chip seal on a road includes coating the road with tar and then 
applying gravel chips over the tar. As the tar congeals it forms a surface that is generally 
impervious to water but only between one-half and one inch thick. 
15. A chip seal does not provide significant structural integrity to a road. 
16. In this case the chip seal was applied in order to minimize toxic dust clouds rising from the 
Town roads, not to provide structural integrity to the roads. 
17. One negative of chip seal is that once a road is chip sealed, it cannot be effectively graded 
to repair potholes or washboarding as the chip seal provides a skin over the road that 
prevents grading. 
18. Following the Town's incorporation the County no longer provided maintenance for the 
Road. Nor has the Town provided any maintenance on the Road. 
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19. Rather, in 2006, TNT Construction, owned by a Town resident, filled the potholes on that 
portion of the Road located in the primary residential area of the Town. It did not, however, 
make any repairs to the rest of the Road. 
20. While the Town complains about the wear and tear on the Road caused by plaintiffs' heavy 
trucks, the portion of the Road repaired by TNT Construction, a section of Road over which 
the trucks must ravel to access Highway 73, has held up remarkably well with the modest 
maintenance that TNT performed. 
21. For many years preceding the Town's incorporation plaintiffs have used the Road as their 
primary access to their farm properties from State Road 73. 
22. While plaintiffs use the Road as a primary access for their properties, the Town asserts that 
plaintiffs have another access form State Road 73: Eagle Mountain Boulevard, then along 
the Lehi-Fairfield Road and finally onto 16000 West (hereafter referred to as the ("Alternate 
Route"). 
23. In actual mileage, the distance to plaintiffs' properties form the Lehi area, traversing the 
Alternate Route is several miles shorter than traveling on State Road 73 to Fairfield and then 
along the Road to the farm properties. 
24. Though the distance is much shorter, plaintiffs do not find the Alternate Route to be an 
acceptable alternative for access to their farm properties. 
25. One of the plaintiffs, Valley Turf Farms, owns a sod farm operation located at the 
intersection of the Road and 16000 West (at the eastern terminus of the Road). 
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26. Valley Turf Farms' business consists of growing sod on its property, harvesting the sod and 
then loading the sod onto flatbed semi-truck trailers and hauling the sod to customers along 
the Wasatch Front. 
27. During the sod growing season, which runs from April until November, Valley Turf Farms 
usually harvest two to four semi-truck loads of sod per day and transports the sod during the 
later evening or nighttime hours for delivery first thing the next morning. Thus, during the 
growing season it is customary for Valley Turf Farms to have two to four semi-trucks make 
the trip on the Road each day. 
28. Valley Turf Farms' management does not allow its drivers to use the Alternate Route for 
access to the sod farm. 
29. This decision by Valley Turf Farms is based on the perception of Valley Turf Farms' 
management that the Alternate Route is much, much rougher, is narrower, has no road 
shoulder (making passing other vehicles essentially impossible without one vehicle or the 
other having to leave the roadway into the soft barrow ditch) and the underlying base on the 
16000 West is a coarse base with sharp edges, resulting in extensive tire damage to the 
Valley Turf Farms vehicles. Additionally the roughness of the 16000 West and the Lehi-
Fairfield road segments of the Alternate Route causes extensive jarring to drivers and to the 
vehicles, causing premature wear and tear on vehicles. 
30. In the view of management of Valley Turf Farms, because of these complaints about else 
roads, the Alternate Route does not constitute an acceptable route to access the sod farm. 
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31. Keith Jonsson owns property that abuts on 16000 West and is located approximately one and 
one-half miles North of the intersection of the Road and 16000 West. 
32. For a long time Jonsson would not use the Alternate Route as it created serious problems for 
those who use it, including damage to tires, damage to the vehicle glass from the constant 
jarring because of the roughness of the road, and when wet, it is not reasonably passable 
because it becomes extremely slick. 
33. Since the preliminary injunction hearing in October and November 2005, the Town has not 
spent any money nor invested any time or labor in maintaining the Road after it leaves the 
primary residential area of the Town. Because the Road has not been maintained, it has 
deteriorated considerably since the preliminary injunction hearing. 
34. As a result of that significant worsening in the condition of the Road, Mr. Jonsson now will 
not use the Road for access to his property. As well, his vendors now ask him to pick up 
supplies in town rather than making deliveries to the farm. 
35. As the Road has continued to deteriorate following the preliminary injunction hearing, 
plaintiffs obtained a bid from TNT Construction for repairs to the S-turn on the Road and 
other repairs. Plaintiffs also agreed to pay all of the coast for these repairs. However, the 
Town refused this offer by plaintiffs. At the same time, the Town has not spent any funds 
to make any repairs to the Road. 
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36. Most or all of 16000 West and the Lehi-Fairfield roads are within the boundaries of the City 
of Eagle Mountain. Yet, the City of Eagle Mountain has not done much to maintain either 
of these roads. 
37. Both are dirt roads and are graded only twice per year by the City. 
38. In 2006 the City laid a course of road base gravel on portions of 16000 West and the Lehi-
Fairfield road. It still does no more than a semi-annual grading. However, Keith Jonsson, 
one of the plaintiffs, has graded his new road base several times per year. 
39. Because the gravel road quickly becomes rutted and rough, anytime that Mr. Jonsson is 
planning to bring big trucks to his farm along the Alternate Route, he first regrades the road. 
40. Scott McLachlan owns property that fronts on 16000 West and is about one mile north of the 
intersection of 16000 West and the Road. 
41. Mr. McLachlan also leases property in the south part of the Town. In order to move cattle 
and hay between his two operations, the only convenient access is the Road. If Mr. 
McLachlan is not permitted to use the Road to travel between the two farming operations, 
he would have to travel many, many miles out of the way. This is not a reasonable 
alternative access. 
42. Though Mr. McLachlan finds the Alternate Route largely unacceptable, he does use the 
Alternate Route to access his property some of the time. He does this because the Road has 
significantly deteriorated, as noted above, because the Town has done no maintenance on the 
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Road east of the townsite proper. Thus, Mr. McLachlan bases his decision on which road 
to use on the then current conditions of each roadway. 
43. Zane Dansie owns a property that fronts on 16000 West and is about one mile north of the 
intersection of 16000 West and the Road. He runs a cattle operation from his property. 
44. Mr. Dansie also leases property South of the Town on which he also runs his cattle. In order 
to move cattle and hay between his two operations, the only convenient access is the Road. 
Like Mr. McLachlan, if Mr. Dansie is required not to use the Road to travel between the two 
farming operations, he would have to travel many, many miles out of the way. This is not 
a reasonable alternative access. 
45. Another problem with the Alternate Route is that the Lehi-Fairfield road intersects Eagle 
Mountain Boulevard at a place where the speed limit on the boulevard is 50 miles per hour. 
The configuration of the intersection requires that, in order to see to the right as a truck 
leaves the Lehi-Fairfield road, the driver of the truck must swing far to the right before then 
turning left. This entry onto the boulevard is very difficult to accomplish with safety as cars 
zoom along the boulevard at or above the posted speed limit, making it difficult for a 
lumbering truck to make the swinging maneuver onto the boulevard. 
46. None of the plaintiffs find the Alternate Route to be an acceptable alternative to access their 
own properties. 
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47. On May 24, 2005, Earthtec Testing & Engineering, P.O., the engineering firm advising the 
Town ("Earthtec") reported the results of a geotechnical subgrade and pavement evaluation 
for the Road. Earthtec reported that the Road had asphalt thickness of from Vi inch to 2 
inches and a road base thickness of from 2 to 7 Vi inches. Earthtec concluded that with this 
road construction, the Road would not support the reported use by between 25 and 30 heavy 
trucks per day. 
48. Three days later Earthtec provided a letter recommending a weight limit on the Road of 3 
tons per axle. 
49. In response to this letter from Eathtec, the Town adopted a weight limit ordinance of 3 tons 
per axle. This weight limit was intended to prevent the large trucks operated by the various 
plaintiffs, and vendors and others providing supplies to the plaintiffs' farms, from using the 
Road. 
50. The initial weight limit ordinance was adopted by the Town without complying with any of 
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-408. 
51. When it first adopted the weight limit ordinance, the Town was not aware that, with limited 
exceptions, weight limits only can be imposed by the State and not by municipalities. 
52. As originally adopted, the weight limit ordinance was so restrictive that school buses, 
ambulances, the Bookmobile and garbage trucks could not lawfully use the Road. 
53. After the adoption of the weight limit many citations were written charging drivers for 
various of the plaintiffs with violations of the weight ordinance. 
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54. Plaintiffs complained to the Town about the citations to their employees and complained 
about the weight limit. They attended a number of Town Council meetings in an effort to 
resolve the disagreement between the parties about plaintiffs' use of the Road. 
55. In response to these complaints from plaintiffs, and when it learned that the weight limit 
ordinance would restrict vehicles which the Town did not intend to restrict, the Town 
requested additional information from its engineers to assist the Town in evaluating options 
for the improvement of the Road. 
56. During this time of discussion, the Town ceased the issuance of weight limit tickets and 
agreed to void all of the citations which previously had been issued. 
57. The parties also considered other possible resolutions to the disagreement over plaintiffs' use 
of the Road. 
58. In July 2005, Earthtec sent a third letter to the Town in which it recommended an alternative 
proposed pavement improvement for the Road. This alternative was prepared by Earthtec 
after the plaintiffs advised they were willing to participate to some extent in the cost of the 
improvement of the Road. 
59. The Town did not make any of the improvements recommended in the July 2005 letter. 
Rather, it sought a further opinion from Earthtec. 
60. On August 25, 2005, Earthtec wrote its fourth letter to the Town. It noted in the letter that 
many of the vehicles needing to use the Road exceeded the 3 ton per axle weight limit and 
that some of the vehicles of Town residents also exceeded the weight limit. It thus 
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recommended that the Town modify the weight limit to 4 tons per axle and a maximum 
weight per vehicle of 18 tons. 
61. For the first time, the August 25,2005 letter also included a paragraph attempting to link the 
pavement deterioration of the Road to the climate. 
62. It is unmistakable that the August 25,2005, Eathtec letter was written by Earthtec to support 
the Town's intention to prohibit use the Road by plaintiffs while not impacting the residents 
of the Town and also to come within the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-408(1). 
63. In reliance on the August 25,2005, letter from Earthtec, on that same date the Town adopted 
a new weight limit ordinance fixing a weight limit on the Road of 4 tons per axle. 
64. Shortly thereafter plaintiffs filed this action and sought a preliminary injunction preventing 
the Town from enforcing the ordinance. 
65. InNovember 2005, following a two-day hearing on the matter, this court issued a preliminary 
injunction which prevented the Town from enforcing the weight limit ordinance. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The only exception by which the Town could alter truck weight limits within the Town is 
provided by Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-401. 
2. The weight ordinance adopted by the Town was not due to an emergency condition and the 
Town did not enact the ordinance as a temporary measure. 
3. Further the Town does not claim that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-208(l)(s) applies to this case. 
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4. The Town has not met the remaining exception provided by Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-408. 
5. None of the four letters from Earthtec, including the August 25,2005 letter which is the first 
time Earthtec referred to the impact of the climate on the Road, provide the necessary 
opinion and specifically engineering inspection required by Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-408. 
6. Because the foundations underpinning the Town's weight ordinance are faulty, the 
presumption of validity which would normally be given to Town ordinances has been 
overcome. 
7. Based on the condition of the Alternate Route and the needs of the Plaintiffs, the Alternate 
Route is not a reasonable alternative to Plaintiffs' need to use the Road. 
8. Because the Town did not meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 72-7-408(1) the Town 
weight ordinance is not entitled to a presumption of validity and therefore it is not 
enforceable and should be permanently enjoined. 
DATED this ZH day of-Aifeuot, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below a true and correct 
copy of FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, in Civil No. 050402661, postage 
prepaid, this l£? day of August, 2007 to: 
V 
FEDERAL EXPRESS 
U.S. MAIL 
HAND DELIVERY 
TELEFAX TRANSMISSION 
Richard G. Allen 
2975 West Executive Parkway #509 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Mark H. Richards 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
3865 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
F:\DATATOUST\MCL\Findract.FairfieTd.wpd 
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JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
KESLER & RUST 
Mclntyre Building, 2nd Floor 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)532-8000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Hogs R Us, Scott C. McLachlan, 
Zane Dansie & Keith Jonsson 
MARK H. RICHARDS (9018) 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
3865 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: (801)272-5600 
Attorneys for Utah Valley Turf Farms, L.C. 
andAult Farms, LLC 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOGS R US, a Utah corporation, SCOTT C. 
MCLACHLAN, an individual, UTAH 
VALLEY TURF FARMS, L.C, a Utah 
limited liability company, AULT FARMS, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, ZANE 
DANSIE, an individual, and KEITH 
JONSSON, an individual 
Plaintiffs 
V. 
TOWN OF FAIRFIELD, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 050402661 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
The Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and having 
heretofore entered its ruling dated May 30, 2007. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Fairfield's weight limit ordinance is declared to be invalid, and the Town of 
Fairfield is permanently enjoined from enforcing the same. 
2. Plaintiffs are awarded their costs of court. 
DATED this •%*/ day of August, 2007 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT: 
% % 
/ J JudgtfXynn W. Dmi^j:'• ;-i-: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below a true and correct 
copy of ORDER, in Civil No. 050402661, postage prepaid, this ffl? day of August, 2007 to: 
FEDERAL EXPRESS Richard G. Allen 
TC U.S. MAIL 2975 West Executive Parkway #509 
HAND DELIVERY Lehi, Utah 84043 
TELEFAX TRANSMISSION 
F:\DATATfJWSTMCL\OSerfrnai.FairfieId.wpd 
Mark H. Richards 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
3865 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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